Real Property by Johnson, Donald Louis
Washington Law Review 
Volume 31 
Number 2 Washington Case Law - 1955 
6-1-1956 
Real Property 
Donald Louis Johnson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Donald L. Johnson, Washington Case Law, Real Property, 31 Wash. L. Rev. & St. B.J. 160 (1956). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol31/iss2/15 
This Washington Case Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
exceed $500. The probate court had not required the posting of a bond before issuing
letters of guardianship. Held: RCW 11.88.100 provides that when the estate of a
minor exceeds $500 posting of a bond is a condition precedent to issuing letters of
guardianship. "It is the gross value of the minor's estate, not claimed net value, which
determines whether a guardian's bond is necessary." The court below had no jurisdic-
tion to enter an order directing the putative guardian to settle the minors' claims and
to execute a valid release.
Probate-Filing of Creditor's Claims. In Shumate v. Ashley, 46 Wn2d 156, 278 P.2d
787 (1955), P filed a conformed copy of a creditor's claim with the executor of the
decedent's estate. The executor rejected it contending that the claim was not in
accordance with RCW 11.40.010-.030. Held: that the original claim, with its
disposition noted thereon, must be filed and become a part of the court record; that,
while the Washington State Bar Association's probate form No. 28 provides for the
use of two duplicate originals, it is not controlling, being drawn only in an excess
of caution. Thus, the executor must be satisfied with a conformed copy served by
regular mail.
REAL PROPERTY
Power of Revocation. In Grove v. Payne' a power of revocation
was found to have been reserved in the grantor of an interest in real
property. A deed conveying a fee simple was conditioned with the
words "... subject to [grantor's] will made prior to this date, with
such codicils as may be added.... The grantee had leased a life
estate to the grantor subsequent to the grant. The lessor retained a
right of entry conditioned upon, inter alia, an attempt to assign the
leasehold interest without permission. The grantor-lessee thereafter
attempted to assign the leasehold interest by quitclaim deed to a third
party. This attempted assignment caused the grantee-lessor to seek an
ejectment of the defendant and a quieting of title.' In sustaining the
plaintiff's claim to a right of entry the court, after holding that the
quitclaim deed failed to pass the leasehold interest, also held that it
was not valid as a conveyance of the grantor's power of revocation by
testamentary disposition. There was no elaboration to why the pro-
vision in the deed constituted a power of revocation by testamentary
disposition. The court's silence raises a question concerning the dis-
tinguishing elements delineating a power of revocation from a power
of appointment. The two concepts bear a close relationship but the
authorities prefer to distinguish them.4
1 147 Wash. Dec. 411, 288 P.2d 242 (1955).
2 Id. at 412, 288 P.2d at 243.
3 The plaintiff relied on RCW 7.28.010.
4 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 318, comment i (1940) ; Old Colony Trust Co.
v. Gardner, 264 Mass. 68, 161 N.E. 801 (1928).
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A power of revocation is the reservation of a power in the grantor to
put an end to the estate granted.' It is often said that this power must
operate to revest the interest granted in the grantor or that the power
of revocation operates in favor of the grantor.' On the other hand, a
power of appointment is a power enabling the donee to designate,
within such limits as the donor may prescribe, the transferees or
appointees of the interest.' The principal distinction then, is that an
exercise of a power of revocation must revest or return the interest to
the grantor whereas an exercise of a power of appointment can, and
practically speaking almost always does, vest the interest in someone
other than the donor. Applying these observations to the Grove case it
appears that the deed conveyed to the plaintiff actually reserved a
testamentary power of appointment. The lack of express language is
of no moment as such is not necessary to the creation of either the
power of revocation or appointment. If the intent of the donor can be
shown it will govern.8 In the instant case the grantor was empowered
to devise the estate directly to any person, the plaintiff's deed being
subject to the provisions and codicils of the grantor's will. Thus it
appears the court relied on the fact that the power remained in the
grantor as the basis of preference for a power of revocation. If so,
then this jurisdiction is clearly at odds with the prevailing concept that
a donor and donee of a power of appointment may be the same person.'
Powers of revocation are predominantly utilized in the trust device
while only relatively occasionally reserved in conveyances of land."0
This factor of customary usage lends additional support to the finding
of a power of appointment. Furthermore a testamentary power of
revocation is somewhat anomalous in concept. The testator revests
the interest in himself (creating a conceptual difficulty in that it is
impossible to vest an interest in a deceased person) only to have it
simultaneously pass by devise or intestacy to others.
Of course, the court may not have wished to infringe upon the con-
cept of the power of appointment in this jurisdiction intentionally. The
5 Clifford v. Helvering, 105 F.2d 586 (8th Cir. 1939) (dicta citing TiFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY, (2nd ed. 1049) reversed on other grounds Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S.
331 (1940).
6 See 3 TANY, REAL PROPERTY § 681 (3d ed. 1939); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
§ 318, comment i (1940).
7 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 318 (1) (1940).
8 See In re Lidston's Estate, 32 Wn.2d 408, 202 P.2d 259 (1949) ; RESTATET.ENT,
PROPERTY § 323 (1940) ; RESTATEMENT TRUSTS § 330, comment a (1935).
0 See RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 319 (1) (2), comment b (1940) ; Fiduciary Trust
Co. v. Mishou, 321 Mass. 615, 75 N.E2d 3 (1947).
it, Id., § 24, comment c (1936).
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recent case of In re Lidston's Estate," the definitive case on powers of
appointment in Washington, is conventional in its treatment of such
powers and may be interpreted to imply that powers of appointment
remaining in a grantor-donor are possible."
The court stated that a power of revocation is not an interest in land
which can be transferred to another. As an adjunct to this it said that
an attempt to transfer or alienate the personal power does not cancel
or destroy it. This is clearly in line with the weight of authority.13 But
it is the law in many jurisdictions that a power, the execution of which
involves no discretion or element of trust, may be delegated to others. 4
Had it been advocated that this was an attempt to delegate a general
power the result would probably have been the same, for it would seem
that if an attempted inter vivos exercise of a testamentary power is
ineffective," so also would be a delegation under the same circum-
stances. But the matter of delegability of powers in this jurisdiction
might have been clarified. Taken in context, the general import of the
court's language in the Grove case appears to be that the exercise of a
power must be effected personally by the donee or grantor.
Rule Against Perpetuities-Factors Favoring a Vested Interest-
The Status of the Rule Against Undue Postponement of Enjoyment
in Washington. In re Lemon's Estate6 involved an alleged infraction
of the rule against perpetuities and a closely related trust concept
termed the rule against undue postponement of direct enjoyment. The
action was brought to determine the validity of a trust to be derived
from the $150,000 residuary estate of Ella C. Lemon, devised to the
National Bank of Commerce of Seattle. The beneficiary was the
Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Association. The testatrix provided
1132 Wn.2d 408, 202 P.2d 259 (1949).
12 The case involved the question as to whether the residuary clause in a will had
created an effective general power of appointment in the executor. In holding that such
a power had been created, the court defined a power as "... .a power or authority given
to a person to dispose of property, or an interest therein, which is vested in a person
other than the donee of the power." (emphasis supplied) It would seem implicit that
a grantor of lands who retains no further interest therein could qualify as a donee under
this definition.
3. Jones v. Clifton, 101 U.S. 225 (1879) ; Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Bowers,
29 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1928) ; 72 C.J.S., Powers § 19 n.38 (1951).
'4 See 13 A.L.R. 1055, 104 A.L.R. 1459.
15 See PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 511 b (7th ed. 1929); cf. RESTATEmENT,
PROPERTY § 340 (1940). The donee of a power not presently exerciseable cannot con-
tract to make an appointment; See also 72 C.J.S., Powers § 39 n.93 (1951). The
rationale principally relied on is that the donee has no right to exercise the power in
a manner contrary to the wishes manifested by the donor in the creation of the power.
See Vinton v. Pratt, 228 Mass., 468, 117 N.E. 919 (1917); Fiduciary Trust Co. v.
Mishou, 321 Mass. 615, 75 N.E.2d 3 (1947).
16 147 Wash. Dec. 21, 286 P.2d 691 (1955).
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for distribution to the beneficiary as follows:
My said trustee shall pay annually the net income of said trust estate
to the Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Association, together with
$2,500 annually from the principal of said trust. In the event that it
shall be impossible for my said trustee to make payments [to the
beneficiary] ... trustee shall make said payments to some other
suitable charitable organization at its full discretion.1
From the terms of the will and the amount of the gift it is apparent
that it would require approximately sixty years to distribute the corpus
of the trust.
The question primarily presented was whether equitable title was to
vest at some future date possibly beyond the period allowed by the rule
against perpetuities,"8 as asserted by the appellant, the testatrix'
adopted son, or whether it had vested immediately. The court held
there was a present vesting.
The reasons given for the finding are somewhat obscure. Among the
more fruitful passages in the opinion are the following:
Quoting In re Quick's Estate'9 the court repeated, "It is a well settled
and just rule that the law favors the early vesting of estates.' 20
"The direction to the trustee to pay annually the net income of the trust
together with a part of the corpus, leaves no doubt that the testatrLx
intended a present vested gift of the equitable estate."
'
21
".... the beneficiary is ascertained and in existence; the trustee has no
discretion, but must pay the entire income to the beneficiary, and the
duration of the trust is easily ascertainable .... 22
From these remarks the court appears to rely on (1) the constructional
preference for vested interests," (2) the mandatory requirement that
distribution of all income (and also a portion of the corpus) be made
to the beneficiary by the trustee,' 4 and (3) the fact that the beneficiary
is presently ascertained and in existence.
17 Id. at 22, 286 P.2d at 692.
18 The rule against perpetuities is usually stated as prohibiting the creation of future
interests or estates which by possibility may not become vested within a life or lives
in being and twenty-one years. See, e.g., Denny v. Hyland, 162 Wash. 68, 297 Pac.
1083 (1931) ; GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4th ed. 1942) ; SIMaEs,
FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 490, 498 (1936).
10 33 Wn2d 568, 206 P.2d 489 (1949).
20 147 Wash. Dec. at 23, 286 P.2d at 693.
21 Id. at 24, 286 P.2d at 693.
22 Id. at 24, 286 P.2d at 693.
23 See 57 Am. Jua., Wills § 1218 (1948); Shufeldt v. Shufeldt, 130 Wash. 253,
227 Pac. 6 (1924).
-
4 See SImEs, FUTURE INTERESFS § 356 (1936) cf. Annot., 172 A.L.R. 455 (1948).
" Id. § 95.
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There are other factors in the Lemon case which are often utilized
to settle the perplexing question of "vested or contingent?" and which
might have been relied upon to reinforce the court's decision."0 There
is a presumption against partial intestacy in the interpretation of a will
when two constructions are possible, one of which will pass the gift by
devise. 7 With regard to the gift over to another organization in the
event that payment to the Yakima Hospital was impossible, the court
said, "It is well settled that a contingent gift over does not affect the
vested character of an estate."2 From this it appears the court felt
that the dissolution of the hospital association was a condition subse-
quent to the vested character of the trust. The presence of a contingent
gift over to another taker often raises a query as to whether some factor
such as survivorship is a condition precedent to the vesting of an
interest. 9 The contention that continued existence of the hospital
association is a condition precedent to the vesting of the interest is
perhaps the strongest argument available to the appellant. But it should
not be permitted to prevail where, as here, the wording is susceptible
to a finding of condition subsequent, for the previously mentioned rea-
sons that the vested interest and a valid devise are preferred." Most
simplified definitions of the word "contingent" say it refers to an
interest so limited that the right to possession or enjoyment is subject
to a condition precedent other than termination of prior interests. 1
Other than the presence of the gift over, there appears to be a signi-
ficant lack of other factors in this case which could arguably be viewed
as conditions precedent. There is no question as to the beneficiary's
present identity nor is its legal capacity presently to take the interest
in doubt.
Where the trustees hold the gift solely for the benefit of the person
ultimately entitled to it, a present vesting of equitable title is favored. "
This concept is adaptable to the instant case where the gift over is
considered a condition subsequent. A mere postponement of posses-
sion or enjoyment per se does not tend to make a gift contingent."
26 For suggested tests and rules used to distinguish vested and contingent remainders
see Id. §§ 68, 95. For rules of construction often used in construing wills with regard
to whether the interest devised is vested or contingent see Id. § 351.2
7 Id. § 351.
28 147 Wash. Dec. at 24, 286 P.2d at 693.
29 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS § 358 (1936).
30Id. § 95. For a comment on the distinction between contingent estates and
estates vested, subject to defeasance see Annot., 131 A.L.R. 712 (gift over discussed
at 718) (1941).31 Id. § 347.
32 Id. § 351.
33 See, e.g., Annot., 110 A.L.R. 1450 (1937).
[SUMME
I:4SHINGTON CASE LAW-1955
The second significant question in the Lemon case arose from the
appellant's alternative contention that there was an undue postpone-
ment of enjoyment of the corpus of the trust with the result that the
trust must fail.34 There is a conflict of authority as to whether a rule
embodying such a concept should be recognized." Washington is now
apparently in the camp of those jurisdictions which ignore whatever
development the rule may have attained. The court said, "The trust
... is to continue for a definite period, which, in view of her intended
purpose, is reasonable."36 This period is greater than that allowed by
the rule.
It should be noted that the rule against undue postponement of
enjoyment does not apply to charitable trusts." The Lemon case was
up on demurrer and apparently no issue was raised as to whether the
Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Association is a charitable institu-
tion. Assuming that it is charitable it is probable that the court would
not take judicial notice of this in light of Susmann v. Y.M.C.A.38 In
any event the decision favoring the respondents made the charitable
question inconsequential."
DONALD Louis JOHNSON
34 The rule against undue postponement of enjoyment is generally stated to be that
a private trust must be limited in duration to a period not longer than lives in being
when the trust begins and twenty-one years thereafter. See, e.g., BOGERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 218 (1951). Thus the time limitation is the same as that in the rule
against perpetuities.
9 See GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 412 n.1 (4th ed. 1942) ; SIMES, FUTURE
INTERESTS § 553 (1936) ; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 378 (1944).
36 147 Wash. Dec. at 25, 286 P2d at 694. In Denny v. Hyland, 162 Wash. 68, 297
Pac. 1083 (1931), the court stated that the rule against perpeluities has nothing to do
with the postponement of enjoyment of vested estates. A private trust was held bad
because there was no vesting of equitable title, primarily due to a condition precedent
of survivorship with regard to the individual members of a class of beneficiaries. The
clear implication was that if the interests had vested, the trust would have been
sustained, despite the fact that equitable and legal title could have been separated for a
period longer than a life or lives in being and twenty-one years.
37 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS § 554 (1936); BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 352
(1951) ; THomPSON ON WILLS § 436 (3rd ed. 1947).
38 101 Wash. 487, 172 Pac. 554 (1918). The court held the charter of the particular
association involved in the case would necessarily have to be consulted to determine if
it was of a legally charitable status. For a note on charitable corporations in this juris-
diction see 12 WASH. L. Rnv. 146 (1937).
311 There is an exception to the rule against perpetuities applied in favor of a remote
charitable gift following a valid, non-remote charitable gift. If the gift to the hospital
is charitable the gift over to another charity, though obviously remote, would be good
under this exception. It must be noted that this does not resolve the question of whether
the interest is vested with regard to the initial gift. Therefore this exception would not
aid the hospital in the instant case unless the court felt that each annual payment was a
separate gift. In such a case it is apparent that twenty-one non-remote gifts would vest
in the hospital. The subsequent payments could be construed as gifts over from charitv
to (the same) charity and so within the exception discussed herein.
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Real Property-Easements by Prescription. In Gray v. McDonald, 46 Wn.2d 574.
283 P.2d 135 (1955), plaintiffs sued to enjoin interference with an alleged easement
by prescription. Defendant filed a cross-complaint for damages sustained by a
temporary injunction. The dispute was over a fifty foot strip of land, located between
the parties' properties in the city of Tacoma, which had been used by plaintiffs and
the public as a roadway since 1910. In remanding the case for a new trial the court
held that plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of an easement by prescription.
Citing authority, the court recited the general principles of the law of prescriptive
rights, as evolved in Washington, as follows: "(1) Easements may be acquired by
prescription. (2) The period necessary to establish a prescriptive right is ten years.
(3) It is not necessary to the establishment of a prescriptive right that the claimant
make declarations of adverse intent. (4) The burden of proving a prescriptive right
rests upon the one to be benefited. (5) A use, at its inception, is presumed to be
permissive. (6) If the user is initiated by permission, it does not ripen into a
prescriptive right unless there has been a distinct and positive assertion by the dominant
owner of a right hostile to the servient estate. (7) The question of adverse user is a
question of fact. (8) Such adverse use must be open, notorious, continuous, and
uninterrupted over a uniform route, and with knowledge of such use by the owner
at the time when he was able in law to assert and enforce his right. (9) When all
the essential elements listed in (8) have been established, there is a presumption
that the use is adverse. The burden is then upon the servient owner to rebut the
presumption by showing that the use was permissive." (at p. 578).
Public Easements by Prescription-Implied Dedication. In Van Sant v. City of
Seattle, 147 Wash. Dec. 178, 287 P.2d 130 (1955), the plaintiff brought action to
quiet title in land abutting a city street. The city of Seattle, relying on previous
decisions in this jurisdiction, contended that a public easement by prescription is not
confined to width actually traveled but includes the width reasonably necessary for
public use. In the instant case this would involve taking twelve feet of the plaintiff's
property in order to complete a planned sidewalk. The plaintiff's predecessor had
placed fences, cultivated a yard, and placed part of the house itself on the disputed
land during the statutory period. The court held that, as public easements by
prescription are based upon an implied dedication by the owner of the land, no
presumption of dedication could arise in the instant case in light of the use and occu-
pation of the disputed land by plaintiff and his predecessor. The requisite of an implied
dedication is new to the case law of this jurisdiction.
Risk of Loss in Eminent Domain Proceedings-Real Estate Covered by Executory
Contract. Transfer of title by virtue of right of eminent domain is not necessarily
equivalent to a "sale". In Pierce County v. King, 147 Wash. Dec. 292, 287 P.2d 316
(1955), the vendors of land taken by eminent domain proceedings contended the
condemnation award was presently payable to themselves on the ground that condemna-
tion is equivalent to sale. The contract provided that upon sale by vendee, the vendor
would be entitled to the principal sum plus interest to the end of the contract. No
provision was made for taking by eminent domain. The court, noting that there is a
conflict of authority on who should bear risk of loss with regard to condemnation
proceedings, adopted the "definite and easily applied" rule, found in 9A U.L.A. § 1 (b),
which provides that where title or possession has been transferred, the vendee is not
entitled to rescind the contract nor to obtain a restitution of the payments made. The
court also held that condemnation was not a "sale" within the meaning of the
non-assignability clause in the instant contract. The court distinguished American
Creameries Co. v. Arnour and Co., 149 Wash. 690, 271 Pac. 896 (1928), by suggesting
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that collateral circumstances of each case must be considered, e.g., intents and purposes
of the parties; the construction of the instrument as a whole.
SALES
Liability of a Manufacturer to Persons Other than His Immediate
Vendee. The recent case of Freeman v. Navaree' illustrates the
liberality of the supreme court in finding an agency relationship in
order to meet the privity requirement in an action for breach of
warranty under the Uniform Sales Act.' The court also dealt another
blow towards the dying concept that privity plays a part in a negligence
action against a manufacturer of personal property.'
In this case, the appellant (plaintiff below) employed a general
architect for the development of the Bellevue Shopping Square. The
architect, with appellant's approval, hired a heating consultant to aid
him in the design of the project. The respondent manufacturer repre-
sented to the heating consultant that it manufactured pipe units for
a completely engineered underground heating system of long life and
high thermal efficiency. On the basis of these representations,4 respond-
ent's pipe units were included in the contract specifications for the
"Square's" underground heating system. The contract was let to a
contractor who purchased and installed the pipe units according to the
contract specifications. In 1949, two years after construction, the
pipes began to leak. The respondent, the heating consultant, and the
contractor, attempted to repair the pipes until 1951, when the efforts
were abandoned. The appellant sued these three parties in the lower
court. At the close of the appellant's evidence, the court dismissed
the suit against the respondent because of lack of privity. The jury
later returned a verdict in favor of the heating consultant and the con-
tractor. No appeal was taken from the jury verdict. The supreme
court reversed the lower court's dismissal for the following reasons:
1. Implied and Express Warranty'
The court began its decision by a general discussion of the privity
requirement in warranty actions. The discussion pointed out that the
privity requirement was born in an age where the consumer dealt
directly with the manufacturer on a personal basis. The opinion went
on to emphasize the significant change in modern day business methods
1 147 Wash. Dec. 686, 289 P.2d 1015 (1955).
2 RCW 63.04.
3 PROssoR, TORTS § 84. (2d ed. 1955).
4 The minority opinion felt the heating consultant did not rely on the respondent's
representations.
G Implied Warranty: RCW 63.04.160; and Express Warranty: RCW 63.04.130.
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